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The Impacts of Politics and Ethnicity 
on Volunteering
Alexandrea Picken and Simon Lewis
Abstract This article examines how national and local ethno-politics impact on volunteering by taking a 
cross-country comparative perspective: Kenya and Mozambique. In both countries societal fragmentation 
along ethno-political lines is mirrored within the volunteer landscape and reduces the positive impacts 
of volunteering. The role of international volunteers (IVs) from the global North and, in the case of 
Kenya, national volunteers (NVs), to address these divisions is discussed. The effects of the support of the 
volunteering for development sector in such ethnically and politically fragmented contexts is also explored. 
The findings from the current research show that the perceived neutrality of the IV and NV means they may 
face less risk in attempting to step outside of existing political and ethnic confines than local volunteers or 
citizens functioning within these environments. Through this neutrality, IVs and NVs may be provided with a 
unique opportunity to use this position to assuage some of these societal fractions. 
1 Introduction
Politics and ethnicity play an important role in 
the capacity of  volunteering to contribute to 
development. This article examines how national 
and local ethno-politics impact on volunteering by 
taking a cross-country comparative perspective: 
Kenya and Mozambique. Specifically, we focus 
on the role of  international volunteers (IVs) from 
the global North and additionally, in the case of  
Kenya, national volunteers (NVs). In both Kenya 
and Mozambique the societal fragmentation along 
ethno-political lines is mirrored within the volunteer 
landscape and reduces the positive impacts of  
volunteering. Specifically, the overt influence of  
party politics in Mozambique means that local 
volunteers and local and national volunteering 
interventions are allocated and accessed through 
political patronage networks and the blurred line 
between political and civil society space. In this 
process, volunteering organisations and groups 
become politicised extensions of  the state. In Kenya, 
‘politicised tribalism’ has had a subtle yet profound 
impact on volunteerism (Lonsdale 2008) wherein 
local volunteering activities and opportunities take 
on a tribal twist which deeply affects local trust and 
social capital.
Despite these difficulties, the Valuing Volunteering 
research corroborates Lough and Matthew’s 
(2013) proposition that ‘[I]nternational volunteers 
are also typically viewed as more neutral and 
impartial than local actors, which strengthens 
claims on fairness’ (Lough and Mati 2012: 20, 
cited in Lough and Matthew 2013). Due to IVs’ 
position as ‘outsiders’, they are often perceived as 
neutral and more trustworthy. Yet it is also true, 
as will be shown through research undertaken in 
Kenya, that ‘volunteers from within the region with 
a high degree of  neutrality may be preferable to 
international volunteers in service as mediators’ 
(Lough 2012: 5). The findings from the current 
research will show that an IV and NV with 
perceived neutrality may face less risk in attempting 
to step outside of  existing political and ethnic 
confines than local volunteers or citizens functioning 
within the prevailing political and ethno-political 
norms. Through this neutrality, IVs and neutral 
NVs may be provided with a unique opportunity to 
use this position to assuage some of  these societal 
fractions. we differentiate between NVs who are 
attached to more formal national volunteering 
schemes or programmes, and local or community 
volunteers who can be more informal and localised.
This article begins by laying out the political and 
ethno-political contexts in both countries and 
the divisions and inequalities these create in civil 
society. Through case studies in Mozambique and 
Kenya, discussion will turn to how these divisions 
are perpetuated in one particular type of  civil 
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society space: volunteer civil society groups and 
organisations. We will highlight the conflict that 
can arise and the impacts this can have on the 
effectiveness of  volunteerism and trust between 
volunteers and the communities where they are 
active. The role the international volunteering 
organisation plays in supporting or challenging 
such divisions will also be touched upon. We will 
see that if  the volunteering for development sector 
continues to treat volunteers, volunteer civil society 
organisations and groups as politically neutral they 
will at least, fail to challenge the inequalities the 
ethno-political hegemony creates there, and at worst 
will support the perpetuation of  these inequalities.
2 Methodological approach
In both countries there were two main research 
approaches taken: systemic action research (SAR) 
and participatory systemic inquiry (PSI). SAR is an 
action research methodology which is underpinned 
by an iterative learning process which embeds design, 
planning, action and evaluation into a single process 
(12–24 months). Action research is underpinned 
by the idea that we learn as much from action as 
from analysis, and that iterative cycles of  action and 
analysis allow rapid learning and the consequent 
generation of  effective adaptive strategies. PSI is a 
shorter process, which allows a system to be mapped 
as a baseline against which changes in the dynamics 
of  the system can be assessed (Burns 2012). PSI can 
underpin an action research process or it can be 
carried out as a process in its own right.
Both SAR and PSI are meta methodologies, which 
can contain many methods. Some of  the methods 
used during inquiries in Mozambique and Kenya 
include the generation and processing of  systems 
maps; rich pictures; monitoring of  workload 
patterns; surveys; participatory mappings such as 
Venn diagrams, social networks, resource mapping, 
force field analysis, community and wellbeing 
mapping, sustainability matrices; story collection and 
analysis (Maxson 2012), immersions, observation 
and transect walks; participatory photography 
and video; open discussions; semi-structured and 
unstructured interviews and dialogues. All of  these 
and more were used to explore and deepen the key 
threads of  inquiry that emerged from the wider 
complex systemic map of  the volunteering landscape 
in each of  the countries.
In Mozambique, two main volunteer systems 
are focal to this article: a small group of  30 local 
volunteers (although different members of  the group 
had differing levels of  involvement in the research); 
and interviews with the IVs involved in the initiative 
and informal discussions with several of  the staff 
from the supporting IV organisation. The examples 
drawn upon come from the National Volunteer 
Council and a community-led volunteer initiative, 
Communities Building Futures (CBF), supported by 
international donors and administered through an 
international volunteer organisation.
Initially, an SAR approach was taken and a period 
of  community inquiry was undertaken by IV 
researchers from three of  the Valuing Volunteering 
countries and a systemic map was produced that 
highlighted the key emergent findings relating 
to volunteering. Thereafter, a PSI approach was 
adopted to explore further the concepts emerging 
from the map. Participatory workshops and focused 
group discussions were carried out with the local 
volunteers involved in the initiative.
The Conselho Nacional do Voluntariado (CNV) 
or National Volunteering Council investigation 
focused on a series of  structured and semi-structured 
interviews with key NV stakeholders, and also 
included observations during national meetings and 
events (such as the election process). Semi-structured 
interviews and some participatory activities were 
undertaken with individuals and small groups from 
volunteering organisations who consider themselves 
members of  CNV.
In Kenya, research was based around three lead 
SAR investigations that ran in parallel; they 
included an inquiry into community volunteering 
in Korogocho in Nairobi, a comparison of  
volunteering in three communities in Mombasa 
and research into the UK government-funded 
International Citizen Service (ICS) in the coastal 
community of  Kilifi. In each case, a team of  local 
volunteer researchers was trained in participatory 
methodologies (in Kilifi the team comprised UK 
and Kenyan volunteers taking part in ICS) to 
lead and steer the research according to emergent 
locally significant issues. Each research team was 
guided through a process of  critical reflection or 
what Freire (1970) terms ‘conscientisation’ whereby 
successive cycles of  action and reflection were used 
to challenge and further understanding surrounding 
volunteerism and its impact on local development.
In addition, six shorter PSIs were undertaken 
at research sites which included Wundanyi in 
the Taita Hills of  southern Kenya, Nanyuki and 
Laikipia in central Kenya and Migori in western 
Kenya. These inquiries typically entailed three 
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to ten days of  fieldwork during which local 
volunteers and residents were engaged to map 
out their development challenges and reflect on 
volunteerism’s past, present and potential role in 
addressing them. Local and national volunteers 
were also interviewed and asked to reflect on their 
volunteer journeys using tools such as rivers of  
experience (VSO 2004).
A national reference group was utilised as an avenue 
for disseminating and testing research findings. 
This reference group comprised representatives of  
major volunteering for development organisations 
operating in Kenya.
In both countries, SAR and PSI inquiry findings 
were validated extensively by repeatedly testing 
emerging insights with multiple stakeholders. In 
community settings this included sessions with 
different types of  volunteers, village elders, the local 
administration such as the village chief, religious 
and faith leaders, business and landowners and 
randomised selections of  local residents. These 
groups were also sometimes deliberately mixed to 
test the applicability of  particular findings to specific 
demographics. A range of  participatory methods 
was used to aid triangulation. The strength of  these 
approaches is that they are built on community 
narratives and thus enable detailed pictures to 
be built of  how and why things happen, and 
participatory methods also facilitate in surfacing 
causal relationships.
Lead researchers were immersed within the 
volunteer context of  their respective countries for 
a two-year period. This facilitated the development 
of  close working relationships between the lead 
researchers and the local volunteers. It also allowed 
the lead researchers to become fully immersed in 
the specific sociopolitical and economic systems 
in which volunteering was taking place. This 
ultimately contributed to a richer and more in-depth 
understanding of  the different volunteer contexts in 
which they were engaging and inquiring.
3 Mozambique
The political context in Mozambique had a strong 
impact on volunteering. While there have been 
democratic elections since 1994, there has been 
distinct polarisation in the candidature by the two 
largest parties: RENAMO, the Mozambican National 
Resistance (Resistência Nacional Moçambicana) 
and FRELIMO, the Mozambican Liberation Front 
(Frente de Libertação de Moçambique). In reality, 
‘FRELIMO has gradually expanded its domination 
and political hegemony’ (AfriMAP and OSISA 
2009: 10) and has been the only party in power 
since elections began. Alongside this there is tenuous 
separation between state and party and FRELIMO 
functions ‘as a political organization that effectively 
controls the state’ (Sumich 2010: 682). This lack 
of  separation gives the party increased power and 
control over access to resources.
Further, FRELIMO manages to maintain wealth 
and power through a variety of  means:
1 It has dominated access to international donors 
and networks (Sumich 2010) and similarly in the 
private sector; and
2 Government party trust-based appointments 
of  managers of  public companies increases the 
party’s access to public resources for political/
electoral activity (AfriMAP and OSISA 2009), 
resulting in a strengthening of  the party whereby 
it channels ‘… demands and interests internally 
and impos[es] constraints on the ability of  
actors to operate independently of  its structures’ 
(Sumich 2010: 680).
This situation has led to a lack of  access to 
opportunity and resources for those outside of  
the party, with advancement being dependent 
upon demonstrations of  loyalty to the party (ibid.). 
FRELIMO’s control extends to civil society spaces, 
leading to ‘Civil Society Organisations (CSOs) 
being dependent on alignment to the governing 
party’s economic elite, or access to donor funds’ 
(DFID et al. 2008: viii) undermining civil society 
voice and government’s accountability to it. This 
blurred separation between civil and political 
spaces undermines CSO autonomy whereby 
‘political parties [begin] making use of  civil society 
organisations to advance their political interests’ 
(AfriMAP and OSISA 2009: 68).
The overarching formal volunteer backdrop 
in Mozambique is the purview of  the Ministry 
of  Youth and Sport. It holds responsibility for 
the design, legalisation and implementation of  
nationwide volunteering, which is perceived to 
contribute to the achievement of  certain ‘strategic 
development areas’ related to youth cooperation 
and solidarity; there is a commitment to ‘stimulate 
the training in and promotion of  volunteering in 
strategic development areas’ (Politica da Juventude 
2013). The CNV is the main volunteer body 
through which the government is attempting to fulfil 
these responsibilities to volunteerism.
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4 The National Volunteering Council (CNV)
‘Volunteers do represent civil society so this is 
why the government want to control them. When 
volunteering is well managed and organised it is 
good for development. When it is more organised 
it has more impact. The problem is that when it is 
organised the government want to control it.’ 
Ex-CNV presidential candidate1
The above quote is best illustrated through the 
example of  the CNV, which is responsible for 
unifying and coordinating national volunteering. It 
was created in 2001 as a committee through a joint 
proposal from the Ministry of  Youth and Sport 
and United Nations Volunteers (UNV), to organise 
an event around the National Year of  Volunteers. 
Initially, there was a ministry-appointed committee 
leadership structure but in 2008, the first general 
assembly elections were held, reflecting the intention 
to shift from a government-directed entity, to a 
democratic council reflective of  volunteering as a 
role for civil society.
CNV is an umbrella organisation with a remit 
to promote, organise and capacity build national 
volunteering; to promote volunteer laws, strengthen 
networks and exchange information between different 
CSOs and youths. In theory, CNV and ministry 
representatives agree the importance of  maintaining 
the council’s political autonomy: ‘… keep the funding 
of  CNV separate from government as it is important 
that the organisation not be seen as political….’ 
(national volunteering expert)2 and ‘…. CNV, it is the 
civil society, the government does not make orders in 
the civil society’ (ministry representative).3 In practice, 
CNV’s potential power as a collective civil society 
platform to challenge or strengthen prevailing political 
authority means that it is appealing to those with 
political interests to use ‘as a tool to connect CSOs for 
the promotion or dissuasion of  the ruling party line’ 
(national volunteering expert),4 and for its strategic 
position – ‘If  organisations are not co-ordinated under 
CNV then they are not part of  a system which can 
call upon government for action. CNV… is like the 
spokes-body between volunteers and the government’ 
(national volunteer logistics manager).5
The battle for presidency of  CNV highlights the 
point at which the political neutrality of  CNV 
becomes questionable. The following statement 
from a previous presidential candidate introduces 
this succinctly: ‘I agree that it is a platform for civil 
society to talk to government and in my opinion this 
is why there is such control over it by FRELIMO’.6 
The permeation of  the party apparatus into this 
volunteering CSO is clear when we consider the 
council’s presidential election assemblies. During 
the research there was a long period of  leadership 
instability, voting and re-voting based on political 
affiliations of  presidential candidates:
CNV is linked to the youth assembly which is part of  
FRELIMO. The new president that is getting voted 
in… he is a member of  a new political party, MDM 
[Movimento Democrático de Moçambique]. 
The youth assembly which is part of  FRELIMO are 
trying to stop him from working and keep calling for a 
new assembly… There have been two assemblies so far 
and they are calling for a third. At both assemblies the vote 
has gone against the current FRELIMO party politics 
(national volunteer representative).7
The leadership has now stabilised and the MDM 
sympathising candidate was unsuccessful. CNV’s 
leadership tensions are reflective of  the difficult 
wider societal relationship between civil society 
and the state. As a result, at the time of  writing, 
CNV was left effectively stagnant as a unifying and 
strengthening entity for national volunteering and 
its power as the interlocutor between civil society 
and government was severely diluted. Local level 
volunteer civil society groups also exhibit similar 
political influences.
5 Communities Building Futures (CBF)
The internationally donor-funded Communities 
Building Futures (CBF) initiative was administered 
through an international volunteering organisation 
and aimed at supporting locally led, participatory 
community development through the promotion 
of  volunteer participation and livelihood/income 
generation activities. After the formation of  the 
community volunteer group, (discussed in detail 
below) members generated five project proposals. 
The projects were mostly based around existing 
skills: chicken rearing, brick, furniture and carpet 
making and a nursery. The idea was to implement 
their projects and share their skills with other 
community members. The volunteers would then 
create small income generation businesses to provide 
livelihood support and meet running costs. These 
would be run by the community volunteers and 
other community members to whom they taught 
their skills. The international volunteer development 
organisation involved would provide support with 
any training requirements and start-up capital that 
might be needed for these projects.
In order to understand how wider existing political 
dominance affects this local volunteering initiative, 
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it is necessary to understand how prevailing party 
politics reaches down to the local level.
The box above depicts the basic local governance 
structure in Mozambique. The bold text highlights 
the secretario do bairro (the neighbourhood secretary, 
SDB). He is an elected local level authority but often 
a member or sympathiser of  FRELIMO in party 
sympathetic neighbourhoods. The SDB is the focal 
point for authorisation and information regarding 
all activities occurring in the neighbourhood. 
Information about what is happening at the 
household and neighbourhood level will always pass 
through the SDB and be relayed to the structures 
further up the administrative hierarchy. There is 
usually a leader for every ten houses (CDC) who 
will report to the leader of  the block (CDQ) who in 
turn feeds all information about the neighbourhood 
to the SDB. When volunteers wish to undertake an 
activity or have an idea for an intervention within 
their community they must usually go through these 
structures to seek the permission of  the SDB.
Key actors in this local governance structure 
have significant influence over access to volunteer 
opportunities and rewards. These opportunities are 
attractive as they may bring training, stipends and 
other resources (although this is not standardised). 
As well as promoting self-directed, community-
owned development, the CBF initiative also involves 
sharing skills with other community members and 
access to start-up capital and support to begin small 
income generation projects and is thus an attractive 
opportunity.
The SDB plays a pivotal role in the CBF initiative 
as community members point out: the SDB ‘rules 
the population of  the neighbourhood’ (community 
volunteer),8 and was responsible for selecting local 
volunteers to participate in the initiative. Initially 
the international volunteer organisation approached 
the community to generate interest from community 
members to volunteer but, ‘The secretario do bairro 
says no, we have an organisation here that is 
doing work here and it has lot of  people inside’ 
(community volunteer),9 so instead of  self-forming 
to address community needs an existing community 
organisation was selected to implement the initiative.
After appointment of  the local volunteer 
organisation, volunteer numbers were augmented in 
order to meet a target number of  volunteer hours set 
by the project. The SDB selected these volunteers 
through local governance network connections. 
These volunteers were ‘the leaders that the 
secretary of  the neighbourhood sent to participate’ 
(community volunteer)10 and ‘The leaders came to 
work as volunteers but in our capacity as bosses, we 
have some who are bosses of  the block but are also 
volunteers’ (community volunteer).11
While this process of  selection may be positive 
since ‘the secretary of  the neighbourhood knows 
that these people have experience’ (community 
volunteer)12 and therefore they hold a degree of  
credibility in the community which will help to 
propel activities or mobilise people, it means that 
those not linked in to the politicised governance 
network may not be afforded the same opportunity 
to access the benefits of  the volunteer initiative. It is 
also important to highlight that while access favours 
FRELIMO supporters it is not limited to them (non-
affiliated volunteers participated in the initiative too).
The SDB motivation for suggesting the local 
volunteer implementing organisation may have 
been the organisation’s prominence and formalised 
status in the community, but there is some strong 
anecdotal evidence that the leadership of  the 
organisation may have political ties: key stakeholders 
expressed on several occasions that the president 
of  the organisation was a chief  mobiliser for the 
FRELIMO party and was often absent during the 
busy party campaign period when his mobilising 
skills would be needed most to organise campaign-
related activities, and key members of  the volunteer 
organisation’s leadership were seen undertaking 
political campaigning in the streets during the 
election period. While this is not definitive evidence 
it hints at the political ties that the leadership of  
the organisation might have. The issue is not about 
participation of  only politically neutral volunteers, 
yet the apparent distribution of  opportunity through 
party lines is problematic. The five volunteer 
project ideas may have been generated through a 
collaborative process by the community volunteers 
District government
Administrative post
Secretario do Bairro (SDB) (neighbourhood secretary)
Chefe De Quarterao (CDQ) (Boss of  the Block)
Chefe de 10 Casas (CDC) (Boss of  10 Houses)
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(politically affiliated or not), but the biased selection 
process reduces the potential for a more organic 
self-forming participatory ethos and reinforces a 
local volunteering situation mirroring wider societal 
inequalities in resource access.
The effects of  this on volunteering are stark. In 
particular, the politicisation of  volunteer activities 
and the utilisation of  volunteering resources to 
advance political motives was observed. The 
leadership is ‘very much tied to the political structure 
and then what they were doing was using the project 
activities… to tell the rest of  the community… that’s 
brought to you by FRELIMO – so there was a direct 
tie’ (international volunteer).13 This emphasises 
how support from international volunteering 
organisations can inadvertently create a space within 
which party power and control over resources is 
strengthened. Thus, when partnering with local 
volunteering CSOs or groups favouring members of  
specific political inclinations, international donors/
non-governmental organisations (NGOs) may be 
unconsciously propagating these societal divisions.
Another impact of  politics on this local volunteer 
group is a lack of  accountability. Within the 
initiative the leadership (primarily three community 
volunteers) of  the local volunteer organisation took 
financial control, dominating access to financial 
information, resources and the sole bank account 
holding the profits and capital for the income 
generation projects. They were not transparent 
about financial movements linked to the initiative 
and concerns about financial mismanagement and 
corruption were expressed. For example, as one 
stakeholder recounts:
It’s like with the chickens, like paying for 1,000 chickens 
and then only ever seeing 250 but the money was all 
distributed for that and it was reported that all those 
chickens were purchased but, the community never ever 
saw those and then when those chickens got sold that 
money never ever made it back into the community 
(international volunteer).14
This implied that it stayed with the leadership. A 
community volunteer described
the war that exists now it is of  corruption, the volunteers 
are producing. The war that exists just now, we want to 
open the bank accounts of  each sector that is producing… 
So for us we see that they [the leadership group] have 
interest and these interests are not for all the volunteers… 
(community volunteer).15
A chronic lack of  accountability of  the volunteer 
leadership core to the other volunteers gave rise 
to the ‘war’ and is reflective of  a systemic problem 
in Mozambique whereby accountability for those 
showing patronage to the party is low. For example, 
‘Mozambique remains one of  the most corrupt…. 
countries in the world, with a rank of  120 in 
transparency’ (Faehndrich and Nhantumbo 2013: 
11), and while stronger democratic processes and 
political will help to reduce corruption (Lederman, 
Loayza and Soares 2001 cited in Ongus 2004: 336), 
these are strongly lacking in Mozambique.
The potential for corruption within the current 
political context is high. While it is true that financial 
mismanagement could occur irrespective of  political 
affiliation, in a corrupt context with questionable 
democratic process and lack of  political will to 
change such a system, it is logical to assume that 
those within political patronage streams, such as the 
local volunteer leadership core, might escape systems 
of  accountability and transparency.
The effect of  this financial mismanagement 
by the leadership was internal conflict or ‘war’ 
within the local volunteer group creating internal 
conflict between the leadership core and the other 
community volunteers and an erosion of  trust 
between the volunteers. One of  the local volunteers 
intimated how the usual community accountability 
mechanisms failed: when the SDB was called upon 
to help he was not able/willing to challenge the 
leadership due to their political connections. While 
the SDB is a key local gatekeeper, he is also caught 
between bottom-up community-driven concerns and 
top-down, party mechanisms and thus his capacity 
to enforce accountability and transparency for local 
volunteering activities becomes diluted.
The politicisation of  volunteering activities and 
the lack of  accountability of  volunteers that are 
affiliated to party political structures causes conflict, 
division and reduces the effectiveness of  the volunteer 
groups and organisations. The issue is not about 
depoliticising volunteers or only volunteering if  there 
is a demonstration of  political neutrality, the problem 
arises when those volunteer spaces, human resources 
and hours are potentially utilised to promote political 
advancement without being transparent. The result is 
the perpetuation of  political hegemony and the blurred 
relationship between state and civil society played out 
within volunteer CSOs and groups, unintentionally 
supported by international donor funding. This creates 
an erosion of  trust and collaborative activities between 
community members involved in volunteering.
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A wealth of  literature exists on the relationship 
between state and civil society and difficulties arising 
due to state over-involvement within these spaces. 
However, there appears to be a dearth of  literature in 
relation to this relationship within volunteer-specific 
civil society spaces (such as CBF and CNV). Lough 
and Matthew (2013) have written extensively on the 
ways that both NVs and IVs attempt to contribute to 
good governance in contexts similar to Mozambique, 
citing the ways in which they can contribute to 
increasing accountability, transparency, voice and 
peace (in the case of  conflict situations). Some of  their 
observations mirror the current finding regarding the 
ways in which volunteers facilitate better governance, 
yet more investigation into how this applies to 
volunteer civil society groups and organisations within 
similar political contexts is necessary.
6 Kenya
In Kenya, the research found that the ethno-
politicisation of  society has had a substantial 
impact on the volunteering landscape. Whereas 
in Mozambique volunteering opportunities are 
controlled by the indistinguishable apparatus of  
political party and state, in Kenya the fragmentation 
of  society along tribal lines had led to the more 
subtle entrenching of  volunteering activities and 
opportunities in line with those ethnic divisions.
Kenya has over 40 different tribes, with the Kikuyu, 
Luhya, Luo, Kalenjin and Kamba representing 
the largest groupings, which together make up over 
70 per cent of  the population (Government of  
Kenya 2013; CIA World Factbook 2015). Despite a 
wave of  nationalistic fervour following independence 
from British colonial rule in 1963, Kenya quickly 
‘embraced extreme tribalistic politics’ (Prunier 2008) 
whereby members of  the ruling tribe were promoted 
to positions of  power. The old colonial legacy of  
administrative divide and rule simply evolved into 
a ‘balkanisation [of] coterminous administrative 
and ethnic units’ (Oucho 2002: xvi).The control of  
state power in Kenya has thus become one of  tribal 
rivalry or what Klopp refers to as the ‘unprincipled 
and divisive competition for state power by members 
of  the political class who claim to speak for unified 
ethnic communities’ (2002: 269). Such rivalry and 
tensions were most visible in the aftermath of  the 
disputed general election in December 2007 when 
the violence claimed over 1,200 lives and displaced 
in excess of  600,000 people (IRIN 2015).
Kenya’s ‘politicised tribalism’ has had a subtle 
yet profound impact on volunteerism in two 
distinct ways (Lonsdale 2008). Firstly, echoing 
fragmentations in society, volunteering activities 
and opportunities in some cases have taken on a 
noticeable tribal twist.
For example, in-depth fieldwork in Korogocho – an 
informal settlement in northeast Nairobi – found that 
various volunteering activities and initiatives often 
became segregated along ethnic lines. This applied 
as much to the volunteering within community-based 
organisations (CBOs) that tended to be dominated by 
members of  a particular tribe as to the volunteering 
projects funded by international non-governmental 
organisations (INGOs). In cases of  the latter, in 
parallel with Mozambique, examples were uncovered 
where international development organisations 
would unwittingly partner with local organisations 
that favoured specific tribes. Within communities 
struggling with social cohesion across tribal lines, 
such activities were often taken as tacit support for 
one tribe over another and ultimately a challenge 
that many development organisations sought to 
tackle was made worse.
In poor and marginalised communities, the research 
found that volunteerism takes on a power dimension 
when it is perceived as an opportunity to gain 
resources – something which occurs more often 
when development organisations pay allowances or 
stipends to volunteers. In this case it also adopts a 
local dimension through competition for livelihood 
resources. As one local resident from Korogocho 
observed:
Some organizations have favouritism and tribalism. So it’s 
only people from that ethnic group who compete for those 
opportunities. Like in the case with [an INGO working 
in the community] who in most cases only recruit 
CHWs [community health workers] who are [a 
specific tribe].16
In other cases, research participants noted how 
serving volunteers would try and ensure that any 
further volunteering opportunities (particularly if  
they came with a stipend) went to people within 
their tribal grouping or family. In places such as 
Korogocho, volunteerism and the opportunities 
associated with it (such as the stipends and 
allowances that INGOs often pay to their volunteers 
and the prospect of  external funding) are thus 
inherently linked to local power dynamics and the 
struggle for limited resources.
In such circumstances, it is not surprising that 
whole organisations emerge as CBOs with an either 
explicit or implicit focus on helping specific tribes. 
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What was particularly revealing from the research 
was how some local organisations would pursue 
this in very subtle ways. Such examples included 
organisation members not using their surnames 
which would mean easy identification of  their tribe. 
In one case, following over six months’ engagement 
with one local CBO, an interview with one member 
uncovered how they felt isolated and marginalised 
within their organisation because they were of  a 
different tribe to the vast majority of  members. 
Even within the organisation, the member noted 
how they were rarely informed when volunteering 
opportunities came up that paid an allowance and 
such opportunities always went first to members 
of  the dominant tribe. As an interview participant 
stated, ‘you’ve not seen how they work, who do you 
think they help first, it is always their tribe’.17
The example illustrates how ethnic divisions, 
although not always explicit, manifest themselves 
in the practices of  some local organisations and 
the ways in which volunteering opportunities are 
acquired and echoes findings from Mozambique 
whereby only those within political networks are able 
to acquire volunteer opportunities and resources.
The second way in which ethno-political 
fragmentation and tension has affected volunteerism 
is through its impact upon local trust and to 
an extent social capital, taken here as referring 
to the presence and strength of  relations and 
networks between individuals, families, groups and 
communities (Putnam 1995; Graham et al. 2013). 
As a ‘people-centred’ and ‘relationship-based’ 
development approach, volunteerism relies on 
factors that promote the development of  strong and 
trusting relationships in order to be effective. For 
example, local CHWs in Kenya reported how it was 
difficult to go about their duties if  the community 
did not trust them. They therefore had to invest 
significant time in earning the trust of  community 
members and building relationships with them. 
However, the research found that ethno-political 
fragmentation eroded trust between people of  
different ethnicities which negatively impacted on 
the ability of  volunteers to work across tribal lines.
Social capital also took on a tribal dimension 
as supporting relationships between people in 
communities became determined by ethnic 
affiliation. With people less likely to volunteer for the 
benefit of  people outside of  their tribe, volunteerism 
therefore acts as a mechanism for perpetuating 
rather than challenging social divides. In poor and 
marginalised communities it was also observed to 
undermine the capacity of  local people to lead their 
own development as people preferred to rely on 
external assistance than risk working together with 
local people from different tribes. As one research 
participant from Korogocho stated:
[Ethnicity] is an issue and leads to dependency because 
people will not trust each other so everyone wants for 
themselves and their tribe and their friends and family. 
So they rely on outside help and wait for a rise in their 
ethnicity which will bring them benefits.18 
The side-effects for volunteering are that people 
are either less likely to want to volunteer or will 
often prefer to volunteer along tribal lines. For those 
volunteers in roles working across ethnic groups, 
the lack of  trust creates a disabling environment to 
building the kind of  relationships that they need 
to effectively undertake their activities. As a result, 
volunteers noted having to invest significant time 
into slowly building relationships. While this was 
not seen as a ‘quick fix’, the research did find that 
volunteerism could still make a valuable contribution 
when such long-term approaches were pursued.
The research in Kenya found that the dynamics 
of  trust created interesting variations in terms of  
the roles and potential effectiveness of  different 
types of  volunteers. For example, in highly divided 
communities such as Korogocho, community 
members noted how they are less likely to trust NVs 
from other parts of  Kenya as they did not know if  
they came with their own agenda. Trust in local 
community volunteers varied greatly from those seen 
as ‘masquerading to defraud and/or exploit others’ 
(local community respondent)19 to more trusted 
volunteers in formalised schemes such as local 
CHWs. Still, even CHWs reported how community 
trust had to be earned and did not necessarily come 
easily, with one stating that ‘sometimes I will not 
be invited in as they see me as a thief ’ or will be 
‘likened to harlots or prostitutes as we go door-to-
door introducing ourselves’.20
While barriers to the effectiveness of  volunteering 
are created by tribal and political divisions, on the 
flip side, in both country contexts volunteers played 
a crucial role in redressing some of  these inequalities 
and negative impacts. As will be explored later in 
the article, one key to this may be in their unique 
position as outsiders to political and tribal norms that 
perpetuate such inequalities, either as international 
volunteers from the global North or as local volunteers 
who are perceived to be neutral to existing societal 
divisions along political or ethno-political lines.
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In the case of  Korogocho, when trust is lacking in 
communities between social groups, IVs have the 
potential to sidestep local/national ethno-political 
tensions. In essence, they can use their ‘outsider’ 
status and perceived objectivity and independence 
to better work across tribal divisions (Lough and 
Matthew 2013: 15). This affords them increased 
trust from the community where they are working 
and was repeatedly referred to across community 
studies in Kenya. In the Korogocho community, one 
local resident observed how,
if  two locals call for a project and then two ‘mzungus’ 
[white people] call for a project then people will run to 
the ‘mzungus’ because when they say they will do or give 
something they will… but Kenyans will say and not do, 
even their elected leaders.21 
The perceived detachment and impartiality of  IVs 
from ‘politicised tribalism’ and inherent corruption 
make their use a potentially valuable development 
intervention in fragmented societies. As one local 
Kenyan volunteer commented,
People have learnt not to trust locals because they believe 
people from the community, just like our leaders, can just be 
mischievous and even lie about helping us. However, help 
from a ‘white man’ – the community believe – is genuine.22
While this may not be true, it is a common 
perception held by community members and 
national volunteers which appears to influence the 
degree of  acceptance and trust placed in the IV 
as compared to the local or NV. In Mozambique, 
one IV from the global North working on the 
CBF project stated that another facet of  their 
role as an ‘observing outsider’ during the process 
helped, ‘especially as an outsider and being a sort 
of  observer for the first little while, it has to be 
somebody’s place to talk about those things when 
they are happening…’. The IV continued:
as an outsider, I faced very little repercussion in saying 
exactly what was going on, I was not scared… I didn’t 
have the fear of  other community members and so it was 
ok for me to be the bad guy. It was ok for me to do that 
and see things that, or to give a picture that may be the 
individuals in the community couldn’t see or couldn’t say, 
so that was part how I viewed my role (international 
volunteer).23
In support of  this idea studies have suggested that 
the best volunteer mediators come from outside 
the area of  the ethnic or political group and ‘may 
play an impartial role in mediating high conflict 
situations, and may be more creative and flexible 
in their approach to solving conflict’ (Lough and 
Mati 2012: 5, cited in Lough and Matthew 2013). 
This role as an outsider can facilitate the volunteer’s 
ability to catalyse and negotiate some specific 
processes to help redress the political or ethnic biases 
experienced when wider societal fractions infiltrate 
volunteering CSOs, groups and initiatives.
A twist to this ‘outsider role’ is seen in the case of  
the Kenyan UNV peace monitors. This volunteer 
initiative employs a targeted volunteer approach 
utilising skilled Kenyan national professionals 
recruited from their local areas to reduce ethno-
political divides and mediate conflict. They provide 
expert support to the national infrastructure of  
peace committees. These operate at multiple tiers 
from the county to the village level and act as a 
means of  mediating local conflicts. Importantly, 
success has been underpinned by a clear recognition 
that a skilled national volunteer with a high degree 
of  perceived neutrality is better suited to assuage 
societal divisions.
Peace monitor volunteers are selected because of  
their perceived neutrality in their communities. This 
can be a sensitive process; where candidates are from 
a major local tribal group, they need to demonstrate 
their experience and desire to work across tribal 
lines. Alternatively, in some cases peace monitors 
are recruited from smaller tribes that are seen as less 
embroiled in local power disputes. For the peace 
monitors it is the combination of  local expertise with 
perceived neutrality that is essential to success. One 
peace monitor based in west Nairobi reflected:
What I’ve realised in this big network of  peace building is 
that communities have built confidence in us, the volunteers 
of  peace. So they need us to resolve their issues. When there 
is a problem, when we come the problem will be resolved, 
because they tend to feel… we are peace builders, we are 
neutral, we are very neutral.24
In additional to their neutrality, local UNV peace 
monitor expertise also allows them to navigate local 
perceptions that may affect their ability to resolve 
conflicts. Having this insider knowledge about key 
stakeholder perceptions in their communities allows 
them to better build relationships between volunteers 
and other development actors including communities 
and the local administration. For example, one peace 
monitor based in Nairobi revealed how being seen as 
connected to the UN was more of  a barrier than a 
helping factor:
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When you’re on your own, you’re normally not UN… we 
don’t tell people, we do not wear that badge, because… 
people in the grassroots communities, they do not 
differentiate between UN volunteers and UN. They only 
see UN as having a lot of  money. Expectations… people 
may expect a lot from you, people even start asking for 
motorcycles! So when we are on our own we are just maybe 
government officials, but volunteers… [and people 
think] you have a big heart if  you’re volunteering for the 
government… it’s a perception.25
Peace monitors that the research spoke to showed 
significant skills in navigating varying perceptions 
in order to effectively carry out their duties well. 
In this case, local expertise and connectedness to 
local networks when combined with perceived 
neutrality has been effective. This supports Lough 
and Mati’s assertion that ‘volunteers from within 
the region with a high degree of  neutrality may be 
preferable to international volunteers in service as 
mediators’ (2012: 5, cited in Lough and Matthew 
2013). As such, peace monitors have managed to 
address ethno-political divisions by acting as ‘insider 
mediators’ (Abdi 2009: 1).
Whether international outsiders or national insider 
mediators, the neutrality that the volunteers 
bring to the volunteering context can assist the 
reduction of  these divisions in several ways. In 
both Mozambique and Kenya, one key area of  the 
volunteers’ success was creating and opening up 
new spaces of  participation and which can have 
significant impacts on redressing the balance within 
volunteering contexts. While most of  the views 
expressed in this section are from the perspective 
of  the IV there is some indication that the local 
volunteers (especially in the case of  Mozambique, 
discussed below) were capitalising on the ‘neutral/
outsider’ status of  the IV who was instrumental 
in helping the local volunteers to renegotiate the 
power imbalance in the initiative.
7 Filling a governance and accountability void
Peace committees in these remote areas of  Kenya 
have been a self-generated response to a governance 
void, caused by a weak state presence, and in part 
fuelled by sub-national inequalities in Kenya’s 
development. As people increasingly feel they 
have an avenue to decision-making processes, they 
become less inclined to use violence and conflict 
as a means to airing their grievances. Vital to this 
has been the use of  volunteers to support what 
are inherently locally rooted dispute resolution 
mechanisms and platforms for building social 
cohesion. As one peace monitor26 reflected, ‘the 
structure has also provided the ownership of  the 
peace work by the community… the conflicts have 
also been managed by the community themselves’.
Through their support to the peace committee 
infrastructure, peace monitors have succeeded in 
creating new spaces and practices of  governance 
and renegotiating relations between the state and 
communities. These committees are spaces for self-
governance where the apparatus of  the state was 
either weak or lacking. This has been particularly 
evident in Kenya’s remote northeast, where they 
have filled ‘the security void left by the government 
in conflict prone areas’ (Adan and Pkalya 2006: vi). 
As one NGO research respondent explained:
You find government institutions within small centres that 
are far away from the people, [there are] very few towns. 
The government officials, security organs that are there are 
few… [and are] either poorly staffed, poorly supplied; 
so there are bad roads and so on. So when incidents of  
violence and conflict occur, the government officials actually 
decide to take cover.27
In Mozambique, there is evidence of  international 
volunteers acting as a link to restore financial 
accountability to the initiative described earlier. 
While IVs were matched to volunteer roles related 
to their skills and expertise, the ‘informal roles’ 
they adopted, as a key link person between the 
local disempowered volunteers participating in 
the initiative and the international volunteering 
organisation accountability mechanisms, became 
crucially important. Due to the IVs’ position as 
‘outsider’ to the community they could act as 
a spokesperson (link) to raise awareness of  the 
conflict and financial mismanagement that was 
going on at community level with the international 
organisation administering the finances. This linking 
role allowed the IV to transmit messages coming 
from the community to those INGO stakeholders 
in a position to support the reintroduction of  
transparency and accountability (through requesting 
financial documentation and accounts and enforcing 
the opening of  individual bank accounts). This 
effectively contributed to dilution of  the power 
that the leadership had over the initiative and 
contributed to rebalancing the power in the local 
volunteer group. The community volunteers directly 
(often covertly) asked for this help as they did not feel 
they were in a position to confront the leadership 
alone and thus were utilising the position of  the IV 
as an outsider to begin to bring some accountability 
and transparency back to the initiative.
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8 Creating new spaces for participation
In Mozambique, the amplification of  community 
volunteer voice towards accountability enforcers 
was not only facilitated through IVs acting as a 
communication link, but the latter also helped 
open up spaces in which community volunteers 
could explore difficult issues occurring in the 
community and communicate these concerns 
to the INGO resourcing the volunteering 
initiative. Due to the IVs’ role as outsider and 
with closer proximity to the INGO, they were 
in a position to organise these participatory 
spaces with little repercussion for themselves 
and create a safer space for local community 
volunteers to participate. This took the form 
of  participatory workshops and joint meetings 
where the volunteers could speak freely away 
from the power-holding leadership. This provided 
a platform to begin redressing governance and 
accountability issues in the community.
In Kenya, a similar volunteer function arises in the 
form of  the peace committees. These have created 
a new tier of  governance based on participation. 
Where they have been most successful is where they 
have reached out and amplified the voice of  the 
most marginalised. One monitor described how 
one of  her greatest challenges was in dealing with a 
particularly violent gang in Nairobi’s Kawangware 
slum. After some time, she was able to engage the 
ringleaders in dialogue, where they confided that 
they felt isolated and marginalised from decision-
making. This was a turning point and they have 
since become engaged in the process and are now 
active as local champions of  peace. This avenue 
for linking marginalised groups to decision-making 
processes is creating a situation whereby ‘a hitherto 
disempowered and voiceless indigenous community 
now has a voice and participates in some governance 
processes’ (Elly Maloba, UNV peace monitor for 
Narok North).28
The effects reported here are primarily based on the 
perceptions of  IVs’ and the researchers’ interactions 
with the community volunteers. However, the 
process of  demanding greater accountability 
appears to have had significant impact in that, in 
the case of  the community volunteer organisation 
in Mozambique, when new leadership elections 
took place, accountability mechanisms were 
re-established. However, the views of  community 
volunteers regarding this process were difficult to 
glean, as the researcher was no longer working in the 
community at this point.
9 Negotiating entrenched and representative 
relationships
Finally, another common finding between the two 
settings which demonstrates the value of  volunteers 
in addressing general societal divisions and those 
which infiltrate and manifest within volunteer 
spaces, is their ability to renegotiate relationships 
and reinstate good governance.
Peace committees and their supporting UNV peace 
monitors have negotiated new relationships and 
governance practices where previous methods have 
either failed or been ineffective (Abdi 2009). A 
good example is the traditionally tense relationship 
between the police and communities. Khadija 
Hassan, a peace monitor in western Nairobi, noted 
how one of  her biggest successes has been building 
trust between communities and the police without 
using force. She describes how ‘we became the 
link between the community and the police’ and 
pioneered the use of  alternative dispute resolution 
mechanisms. With a preference for mediation over 
arbitration, the peace committees have modelled a 
new way of  resolving conflicts, rebuilt trust between 
communities and the local administration and 
fostered dialogue and participation where once there 
used to be only state command and control (Africa 
Development Alternatives 2009).
In Maputo the politically linked leadership of  CBF 
initiative was not seen by the other volunteers as 
representative of  their group. The leadership core 
had been elected as representatives of  the pre-
existing local organisation selected by the SDB. 
Community volunteers requested of  the INGO that 
they ‘come to meet with us in the feeling to create 
a proper structure for [our volunteer group]… 
because this structure doesn’t exist’ and further
we ask for help also for the elaboration of  the regulations, 
that regulate the functions of  the volunteers… These 
documents are very important for the volunteer. These 
documents will cut the wings of  [the leadership core] 
because the volunteers will have their own legal instrument 
to do their work.29
This request came from a group of  community 
volunteers outside the power core, during a covertly 
requested meeting with an IV working on the 
project. As a result of  the ‘safe space’ created to 
enable these discussions, the local volunteers were 
able to request new elections and support for the 
devolution of  power and these messages were 
transferred to the INGO by the IV. The local 
volunteers could not be seen to ask openly for an 
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election themselves, whereby they proposed that 
the INGO support them to redistribute power, 
not through announcing a need for an election 
immediately and outright, because ‘it would seem 
that there is an escape of  information’ (community 
volunteer).30 They preferred a less risky way to 
redistribute the power through holding an election 
about the opening of  separate bank accounts for 
each of  the five different projects, stating: ‘… this 
separation of  the accounts, that will be opened for 
the members, this will be a distribution of  power’ 
(community volunteer).31
The role of  the IV was to hold a space for local 
disempowered volunteers to voice their concerns, 
answering their need for non-confrontational support 
to negotiate with community power holders and 
link it back to the INGO with the power to enforce 
accountability. In this manner they have the support 
of  ‘outsiders’ to shift the leadership and control of  
power of  the volunteering civil society group.
The community volunteers actively sought the 
support of  the IV in the hope of  reinstating 
accountability and representative leadership in the 
local community volunteer group. Further, they 
carefully advised how the IV should interact with the 
power holders in the community volunteer group, 
using the position of  the IV to their advantage 
when they were unable to take on an overtly power-
challenging role themselves.
10 Conclusions
From the research in these country contexts, 
initial findings highlighted the negative impacts 
of  wider systemic political and ethnic divisions 
in volunteer CSOs, groups and initiatives. These 
include biased access to volunteer opportunities 
and resources; volunteers opting to offer help only 
to those in their own tribal network; stagnant and 
ineffectual volunteering which is prohibitive to 
volunteers’ capacity to collectively or individually 
affect change; the perpetuation of  corruption and 
lack of  accountability in these volunteer examples 
and in the worst case the strengthening of  biased 
political and ethnic divisions and practices through 
the support and creation of  volunteer spaces where 
these tensions infiltrate.
However, the role that IV and NV ‘outsiders’ can 
play in negotiating complex power relationships that 
occur in ethno-politically influenced environments 
or in volunteer civil society groups where such power 
dynamics have permeated is apparent. The value 
of  neutral NVs and global North IVs in negotiating 
more representative relationships and structures and 
building trust between previously conflicting groups, 
is a strong emergent research theme. This theme was 
reinforced by the experiences and perceptions of  
the IVs but also it is evident that in some cases (the 
CBF initiative) local volunteers use the IV to their 
advantage by calling upon and actively utilising the 
IV in attempts to renegotiate or reclaim their power.
Further, in Kenya, the research would appear to 
strengthen the assertion that ‘theory and practice 
predict that volunteers from outside may make a 
significant contribution as third-party intermediaries 
and may work with local actors to pressure decision-
makers to reconsider priorities’ (Lough and Matthew 
2013: 16) whereby the perceived neutrality of  NVs 
such as the local peace monitors appears to facilitate 
reinstatement of  governance and accountability 
mechanisms in volunteering organisations, 
groups and the wider community, through 
creating increased ownership over platforms for 
disempowered groups to link with decision-makers.
In Mozambique, IVs provide a communication 
route for volunteers to link to key INGO 
stakeholders helping to restore accountability at 
the community level, also in alignment with Lough 
and Matthew’s (2013: 8) finding: that ‘volunteers’ 
connections as independent agents heighten 
organisational transparency and accountability’. 
The result being, that the INGO through the IV 
can begin to rebalance accountability. This stands in 
contrast to the previous point regarding the INGOs’ 
potential to inadvertently perpetuate political or 
ethnic divisions through funding local volunteer 
civil society spaces that manifest these biases, and 
highlights the importance of  volunteer INGOs being 
well-informed of  such societal divisions beforehand 
in order to maximise their capacity to counter these 
divisions rather than worsen them.
Another valuable effect of  the IV and NV was 
their ability to amplify the voice of  the more 
marginalised, who were often on the wrong side 
of  the political or ethnic divide. This is crucial 
to begin to empower local communities through 
meaningful participation. Yet, there are central 
factors to consider which influence the ability of  the 
volunteer to engage in these roles; while the position 
of  a neutral outsider helps to transcend the ethno-
political boundaries experienced by local volunteers 
and citizens, it places a heavy responsibility on 
the individual volunteer. Doubtless it requires 
a politically savvy volunteer with good self-
awareness to understand the wider context in which 
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volunteering is taking place and their positionality 
within this. In Kenya, effective international 
volunteers were essentially seen to merge their 
‘outsider’ status with ‘insider’ knowledge. The time 
taken to develop an understanding of  the political 
context is an important consideration for INGOs 
working through volunteers in such contexts, if  they 
want them to be able to navigate these complex 
societal dynamics and prevent perpetuation of  
such. It is not only the neutrality of  volunteers 
that helps to address these divisions, they also need 
to have the right skill set and approach to interact 
successfully in such situations. As Lopez Franco 
and Shahrokh (2012) state, volunteer ‘capacity 
development interventions are constantly perceived 
as a technical endeavour, avoiding critical reflections 
on what capacities are required to enable people 
and organisations to understand and change the 
dynamics of  power that impede social change 
from happening’ (Clarke and Oswald 2010: 1, 
cited in Lopez Franco and Shahrokh 2012); hence, 
de-politicising the act of  building capacities through 
volunteering’. There is an important consideration 
if  volunteer-supporting organisations are to begin 
to create change within such ethno-politically 
hegemonic contexts.
Whether an IV or an NV in a local context, 
stakeholders with an interest in volunteering for 
development must ask themselves how they will 
begin to weigh up the best combination of  volunteers 
for differing contexts. Perhaps being more strategic 
about the potential of  volunteers to play the ‘neutral 
outsider’ role will better enable stakeholders in the 
volunteering sector to provide a tailored approach 
to volunteering that can begin to dilute entrenched 
political and ethnic biases and contribute to more 
effective volunteering for development. Crucial to 
this is that volunteer-supporting organisations should 
consider the degree to which they can prepare 
volunteers for entering politically or ethnically 
charged environments. Especially when considering 
the risk to volunteers who attempt to confront or 
counteract a dominant hegemony in these situations. 
If  this is to be an explicit role for volunteers it is 
crucial for the volunteer development sector to begin 
asking how best to protect and prepare the volunteers 
(IVs or NVs) for these situations.
When structural issues are recognised and 
addressed, in the contexts where the IV or NV are 
active, this may make it easier for communities to 
utilise the volunteers’ skills and experience (Lopez 
Franco and Shahrokh 2012). We see this in the case 
of  Mozambique: where IVs were able to begin to 
directly combat some of  the effects of  this type of  
politicisation at a localised community level and 
local community members actively utilised them to 
help re-establish equality within their group.
The question remains as to the capacity of  
volunteers to have similar effects in the national 
volunteer arena (CNV), where the link between 
powerful overarching political agendas and 
volunteering is played out more visibly and, where 
the potential for civil society collective voice to 
more powerfully challenge the political or ethnic 
hegemony is present. We must question whether it 
is realistic and appropriate to expect international 
or NVs to utilise their outsider role in combating 
these bigger structural inequalities and ask whether 
Lough’s assertion that individual volunteers have 
difficulty in undertaking such a task alone (2012) 
holds true in such ethno-politically divided contexts.
This brings us to question whether the volunteer’s 
position as a neutral outsider aiming to re-establish 
aspects of  good governance might be more effective 
at the local level. While the Kenyan UNV peace 
monitor approach and the work of  Lough and 
Matthew (2013) provide good examples of  the 
ways in which volunteers attempt to combat these 
wider structural issues affecting governance in civil 
society, the ways in which volunteers attempt to do 
this in specific volunteer civil society spaces needs 
more exploration. If  the volunteer sector can begin 
to acknowledge and counter these wider structural 
political and ethnic divisions, this could go far in 
ensuring that civil society volunteer spaces remain 
effective, transparent and free from the permeation 
of  such political and ethnic divisions in society that 
perpetuate inequality.
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5 Interview, Maputo, 2012.
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9 Interview, Chamanculo, 2014.
10 Interview, Chamanculo, 2014.
11 Interview, Chamanculo, 2014.
12 Interview, Maputo, 2014.
13 Interview, Maputo, 2014.
14 Interview, Maputo, 2014.
15 Interview, Maputo, 2014.
16 Interview, Korogocho, 9 April 2014.
17 Interview, Baba Dogo, Naiorbi, 22 January 2013.
18 Interview, Korogocho chief ’s camp, 18 February 
2014.
19 Focus group response conducted on 8 April 2014, 
Korogocho chief ’s camp.
20 Interview, Korogocho, 7 April 2014.
21 Interview, Korogocho, 3 September 2013.
22 Interview, Korogocho, 19 March 2014.
23 Interview, Maputo, 2014.
24 Interview, Nairobi city centre, 28 May 2014.
25 Interview, 10 June 2014.
26 Email questionnaire response, 25 May 2014.
27 Interview, Kilimani, west Nairobi, 29 January 2014.
28 Email questionnaire response, 4 June 2014.
29 Interview, Maputo, 2014.
30 Interview, Maputo, 2014.
31 Interview, Maputo, 2014.
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